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References: [ +subject:/^(?:^\s*(re|sv|fwd|fw)[\[\]\d]*[:>-]+\s*)*\[PATCH\s+03\/24\]\s+net\:\s+add\s+a\s+new\s+sockptr_t\s+type\s*$/: 7 ]

Total 7 documents matching your query.

1. Re: [PATCH 03/24] net: add a new sockptr_t type (score: 1): Author: Christoph Hellwig <hch@xxxxxx>; Date: Wed, 22 Jul 2020 09:56:20 +0200; current mainline has almost no set_fs left, and setsockopt seems pretty much safe. But if we go back a long term stable release or two I bet I'd find one or two.; /html/lvs-devel/2020-07/msg00081.html (15,552 bytes)
2. RE: [PATCH 03/24] net: add a new sockptr_t type (score: 1): Author: David Laight <David.Laight@xxxxxxxxxx>; Date: Tue, 21 Jul 2020 10:14:20 +0000; ... If you need to do that you might as well make it a struct where either the kernel or user address is defined. Far safer for all architectures. Indeed you could add the length (to save passing an; /html/lvs-devel/2020-07/msg00075.html (17,405 bytes)
3. RE: [PATCH 03/24] net: add a new sockptr_t type (score: 1): Author: David Laight <David.Laight@xxxxxxxxxx>; Date: Tue, 21 Jul 2020 09:55:20 +0000; ... One thought I've had is that on 64-bit architectures there is almost always some part of the KVA that can never be valid and is larger than the maximum size of a user VA. If the user address is o; /html/lvs-devel/2020-07/msg00074.html (17,027 bytes)
4. Re: [PATCH 03/24] net: add a new sockptr_t type (score: 1): Author: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@xxxxxxxxxx>; Date: Mon, 20 Jul 2020 10:55:43 -0700; Yes. I thought that eliminating that class of bug is one of the main motivations for your "remove set_fs" work. See commit 128394eff343 ("sg_write()/bsg_write() is not fit to be called under KERNEL_D; /html/lvs-devel/2020-07/msg00066.html (14,243 bytes)
5. Re: [PATCH 03/24] net: add a new sockptr_t type (score: 1): Author: Christoph Hellwig <hch@xxxxxx>; Date: Mon, 20 Jul 2020 19:43:22 +0200; Yeah, we'll need to validate that before initializing the pointer. But thinking this a little further: doesn't this mean any set_fs(KERNEL_DS) that has other user pointers than the one it is intended; /html/lvs-devel/2020-07/msg00064.html (14,030 bytes)
6. Re: [PATCH 03/24] net: add a new sockptr_t type (score: 1): Author: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@xxxxxxxxxx>; Date: Mon, 20 Jul 2020 09:37:48 -0700; How does this not introduce a massive security hole when CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_NON_OVERLAPPING_ADDRESS_SPACE? AFAICS, userspace can pass in a pointer >= TASK_SIZE, and this code makes it be treated as a ke; /html/lvs-devel/2020-07/msg00062.html (16,667 bytes)
7. [PATCH 03/24] net: add a new sockptr_t type (score: 1): Author: Christoph Hellwig <hch@xxxxxx>; Date: Mon, 20 Jul 2020 14:47:16 +0200; Add a uptr_t type that can hold a pointer to either a user or kernel memory region, and simply helpers to copy to and from it. For architectures like x86 that have non-overlapping user and kernel add; /html/lvs-devel/2020-07/msg00056.html (16,648 bytes)

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