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On Mon, Jul 20, 2020 at 10:55:43AM -0700, Eric Biggers wrote:
> On Mon, Jul 20, 2020 at 07:43:22PM +0200, Christoph Hellwig wrote:
> > On Mon, Jul 20, 2020 at 09:37:48AM -0700, Eric Biggers wrote:
> > > How does this not introduce a massive security hole when
> > > CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_NON_OVERLAPPING_ADDRESS_SPACE?
> > >
> > > AFAICS, userspace can pass in a pointer >= TASK_SIZE,
> > > and this code makes it be treated as a kernel pointer.
> >
> > Yeah, we'll need to validate that before initializing the pointer.
> >
> > But thinking this a little further: doesn't this mean any
> > set_fs(KERNEL_DS) that has other user pointers than the one it is
> > intended for has the same issue? Pretty much all of these are gone
> > in mainline now, but in older stable kernels there might be some
> > interesting cases, especially in the compat ioctl handlers.
>
> Yes. I thought that eliminating that class of bug is one of the main
> motivations for your "remove set_fs" work. See commit 128394eff343
> ("sg_write()/bsg_write() is not fit to be called under KERNEL_DS") for a case
> where this type of bug was fixed.
>
> Are you aware of any specific cases that weren't already fixed? If there are
> any, they need to be urgently fixed.
current mainline has almost no set_fs left, and setsockopt seems
pretty much safe. But if we go back a long term stable release or two
I bet I'd find one or two.
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