On Fri, Apr 26, 2013 at 08:59:07AM -0700, Eric Dumazet wrote:
> On Fri, 2013-04-26 at 08:45 -0700, Paul E. McKenney wrote:
>
> > I have done some crude coccinelle patterns in the past, but they are
> > subject to false positives (from when you transfer the pointer from
> > RCU protection to reference-count protection) and also false negatives
> > (when you atomically increment some statistic unrelated to protection).
> >
> > I could imagine maintaining a per-thread count of the number of outermost
> > RCU read-side critical sections at runtime, and then associating that
> > counter with a given pointer at rcu_dereference() time, but this would
> > require either compiler magic or an API for using a pointer returned
> > by rcu_dereference(). This API could in theory be enforced by sparse.
> >
> > Dhaval Giani might have some ideas as well, adding him to CC.
>
>
> We had this fix the otherday, because tcp prequeue code hit this check :
>
> static inline struct dst_entry *skb_dst(const struct sk_buff *skb)
> {
> /* If refdst was not refcounted, check we still are in a
> * rcu_read_lock section
> */
> WARN_ON((skb->_skb_refdst & SKB_DST_NOREF) &&
> !rcu_read_lock_held() &&
> !rcu_read_lock_bh_held());
> return (struct dst_entry *)(skb->_skb_refdst & SKB_DST_PTRMASK);
> }
>
> (
> http://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/davem/net.git/commit/?id=093162553c33e9479283e107b4431378271c735d
> )
>
> Problem is the rcu protected pointer was escaping the rcu lock and was
> then used in another thread.
All the way to some other thread? That is a serious escape! ;-)
> What would be cool (but expensive maybe) , would be to get a cookie from
> rcu_read_lock(), and check the cookie at rcu_dereference(). These
> cookies would have system wide scope to catch any kind of errors.
I suspect that your cookie and my counter are quite similar.
> Because a per thread counter would not catch following problem :
>
> rcu_read_lock();
>
> ptr = rcu_dereference(x);
> if (!ptr)
> return NULL;
> ...
>
>
> rcu_read_unlock();
>
> ...
> rcu_read_lock();
> /* no reload of x, ptr might be now stale/freed */
> if (ptr->field) { ... }
Well, that is why I needed to appeal to compiler magic or an API
extension. Either way, the pointer returned from rcu_dereference()
must be tagged with the ID of the outermost rcu_read_lock() that
covers it. Then that tag must be checked against that of the outermost
rcu_read_lock() when it is dereferenced. If we introduced yet another
set of RCU API members (shudder!) with which to wrapper your
ptr->field use, we could associate additional storage with the
pointer to hold the cookie/counter. And then use sparse to enforce
use of the new API.
Of course, if we were using C++, we could define a template for pointers
returned by rcu_dereference() in order to make this work. Now, where
did I put that asbestos suit, you know, the one with the titanium
pinstripes? ;-)
But even that has some "interesting" issues. To see this, let's
modify your example a bit:
rcu_read_lock();
...
rcu_read_lock_bh();
ptr = rcu_dereference(x);
if (!ptr)
return NULL;
...
rcu_read_unlock_bh();
...
/* no reload of x, ptr might be now stale/freed */
if (ptr->field) { ... }
...
rcu_read_unlock();
Now, is it the rcu_read_lock() or the rcu_read_lock_bh() that protects
the rcu_dereference()?
Thanx, Paul
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe lvs-devel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
|